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BOOK REVIEW
OUTLINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. By Paul R. Conway. Washington, D.C.:
Lerner Law Publishing Company, Inc. 1973. Pp. xv, 195.
By WALTER H. E. JAEGER*
In format, the Outline of Administrative Law' greatly resembles the
author's earlier Outline of Contracts.2 Thus, in the contracts outline Professor
Conway keys his material to the two major treatises on contract law,
Williston on Contracts3 and Corbin on Contracts, 4 and in the Outline of
Administrative Law, the cases digested are keyed to the three most frequently
used works on administrative law.' The keys or symbols employed are the
initials of the author-editors of the three administrative law texts.
The Outline is divided into sixteen chapters. The Table of Contents is a
model of clarity since it shows the sections and subsections which comprise
each chapter, thus taking the place of a formal index. After a short
introduction, in separate chapters the author examines the delegation of
legislative powers and compulsory process to obtain information. The next
five chapters deal with judicial review of administrative decisions.
6
In his discussion of the statutory methods of obtaining judicial review,'
Professor Conway examines the declaratory judgment. This statutory remedy,
as is generally known, affords a person the right to petition a court to declare
any rights he may have in a given matter. Aside from its use in contracts such
as insurance policies,8 the declaratory judgment is commonly used in cases
where the petitioner's legal status as an alien or a citizen is an essential fact,
* M.S., LL.B., S.J.D., Ph.D., Georgetown University; Diploma, Faculty of Law,
University of Paris; Diploma, Ecole libre des Sciences politiques (Paris); Diploma, Academy of
International Law, The Hague. Member: Bars of District of Columbia and Supreme Court of the
United States.
Professor of Law, and formerly Director of Graduate Research, Georgetown University Law
Center; Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, lIT Chicago-Kent College of Law; author-editor
of WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, third edition, of which seventeen volumes have been published to
date.
1. P. CONWAY, OUTLINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1973) [hereinafter cited as CONWAY].
2. P. CONWAY, OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1968), reviewed, Jaeger, 49
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 244 (1972).
3. S. WILLSTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. Jaeger 1957-1975)
(17 volumes) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, JAEGER ED.].
4. A. CORBIN, LAW OF CONTRACTS (1962).
5. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1972); W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW (1970); L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1968).
6. CONWAY, supra note 1, chs. IV-VIII.
7. Id. at 31-33.
8. 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, JAEGER ED., supra note 3, ch. 31, "Contracts of
Insurance" (1963).
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vital in the administrative determination of the validity of a deportation
proceeding or order. Declaratory relief can also be used to great advantage to
test whether an order is interlocutory or final.9 Further, injunctive relief is
often sought when a federal question is involved and the amount in
controversy is $10,000 or more.' 0
As pointed out by the author, general judicial review is provided by
statute, specifically the federal Administrative Procedure Act" which is
quoted in pertinent part:
Scope of Review. To the extent necessary to decision and when
presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of
law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine
the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The
reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and
conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limita-
tions, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject
to section 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the
record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts
are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the
whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account
shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.'
Professor Conway's comment is noteworthy: "Despite our uncer-
tainty as to whether the Supreme Court will uphold the wide availability of the
Administrative Procedure Act's review provisions, as obviously intended by
its draftsmen, we can nevertheless conclude as a minimum, at this writing,
that the A.P.A. does at least three things: (a) It codifies and thereby
strengthens the presumption of the reviewability of administrative action. (b)
It provides an additional remedy. (c) It provides a more flexible remedy."' 3
In accordance with a long established rule, initially formulated by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Smyth v. Ames, 14 the courts have
9. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
11. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et. seq. (1970).
12. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
13. CONWAY, supra note 1, at 33.
14. 169 U.S. 466 (1898), modified, 171 U.S. 362 (1898)
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adopted a "self-denying" attitude towards the finding of facts of administra-
tive agencies when they are predicated upon substantial evidence of a
probative character. Smyth dealt with an administrative determination by the
"grandfather" of administrative agencies, the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. 5 The gist of the Court's opinion is, simply, that where the Congress has
entrusted the regulatory body with the ascertainment of facts, i.e., the
investigative function, there is no occasion for judicial review of such facts.
16
In this connection, and of special interest is Chapter VII, "Scope of
Judicial Review of Questions of Fact," wherein Professor Conway discusses
the substantial evidence rule and carefully digests the leading cases. It is
reassuring to find a classic precedent, Universal Camera Corp. v. National
Labor Relations Board." Here we are told that the standard of probative
evidence required to support an administrative decision must be more than a
mere scintilla-it must be substantial. This, the Supreme Court of the United
States had decided insofar as the National Labor Relations Board is
concerned, as far back as National Labor Relations Board v. Consolidated
Edison Company of New York.' s
The administrative agency's factual determination "of course, is subject
to review, but when supported by evidence is accepted as final; not that its
decision ... can be supported by a mere scintilla of proof-but the courts will
not examine the facts further than to determine whether there was substantial
evidence to sustain the order."1 9
In Universal Camera,0 the National Labor Relations Board had declined
to be bound by its hearing examiner's findings and rejected his recommenda-
tion. The court of appeals deemed itself bound by the Board's rejection since
the Supreme Court had previously held that the Board was not bound by the
findings of its own hearing examiner.2 On appeal, the Supreme Court of the
15. Established by The Interstate Commerce Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
See 10 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, JAEGER ED., supra note 3, ch. 36A (1967).
16. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
17. 340 U.S. 474 (1951), rev'g 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950).
18. 305 U.S. 197 (1938). See JAEGER, CASES AND STATUTES ON LABOR LAW 803
(1941).
19. ICC v. Union Pacific R.R., 222 U.S. 541, 547-48 (1912). In United States v. Carlo
Bianchi & Co., the Supreme Court said:
Moreover, the standard of review adopted in the Wunderlich Act-'arbitrary,' 'capri-
cious,' and 'not supported by substantial evidence'-have frequently been used by
Congress and have consistently been associated with a review limited to the administra-
tive record. The term 'substantial evidence' in particular has become a term of art to
describe the basis on which an administrative record is to be judged by a reviewing
court. This standard goes to the reasonableness of what the agency did on the basis of
the evidence before it, for a decision may be supported by substantial evidence even
though it could be refuted by other evidence that was not presented to the decision-
making body.
373 U.S. 709, 715 (1963).
20. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
21. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950). As Professor
Conway digested the case, "The hearing examiner found that the testimony of employee X at an
NLRB hearing on Union representation was not a cause of X's subsequent discharge, and found
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United States concluded: 1. The standard of proof required of the National
Labor Relations Board by the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act"2 is the same as that to be exacted by courts reviewing every other
administrative action that may be subject to the Administrative Procedure
Act; 2. The concept of substantial evidence must be considered against
whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, particularly including an
adverse report and findings by a hearing examiner. In holding that it was
barred from taking into account the report of the hearing examiner on
questions of fact, the court of appeals was in error; 3. The Labor-
Management Relations Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and subse-
quent amendments, all evince a Congressional purpose to increase the role of
the hearing examiner in the administrative process.2 3
On remand to the court of appeals, 4 Judge Learned Hand observed:
"Just where the Board's specialized experience ends it may no doubt be hard
to say; but we are to find the boundary and beyond it to deem ourselves as
competent as the Board to pass upon issues of fact. We hold that all the
issues at bar are beyond the boundary and for that reason we cannot accept
that X had said he intended to resign soon. The Board refused to accept these findings of its own
hearing examiner, made contrary findings of fact, and issued an order to Universal to reinstate X
with back pay. It sought enforcement of its order in the federal circuit court of appeal, which
ordered enforcement of the order. Certiorari to the Supreme Court, 1951, 340 U.S. 474, which
reversed the Court of Appeal." CONWAY supra note 1, at 74-5.
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et. seq. (1970). This statute is extensively discussed in 9 WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS, JAEGER ED., supra note 3, at 345-60 (1967).
23. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). Conway summarizes the
Supreme Court's holding: "The Board is not bound by, but it must at least read and consider,
along with all other material evidence, the findings and recommendations of its examiner; it may
not ignore them." CONWAY, supra note 1, at 162. In the language of the Court:
The Taft-Hartley Act provides that 'The findings of the Board with respect to
questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a
whole shall be conclusive.' . . . [Slurely an examiner's report is as much a part of the
record as the complaint of the testimony. According to the Administrative Procedure
Act, 'All decisions (including initial, recommended or tentative decisions) shall become
a part of the record .....
It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that the plain language of the statute
directs a reviewing court to determine the substantiality of evidence on the record
including the examiner's report....
In remanding the case, the Court wrote that '[o]n reconsideration of the record it
[the court of appeals) should accord the findings of the trial examiner the relevance that
they reasonably command in answering the comprehensive question whether the
evidence supporting the Board's order is substantial.'
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra at 493, 497.
24. In NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951), the court of
appeals upheld Universal Camera's appeal and dismissed the NLRB's complaint. Conway's
treatment of the case posits two grounds for the holding and includes excerpts from the opinion:
(i) The Congressional amendment of the National Labor Relations Act as a result
of public dissatisfaction with the hostility toward employers displayed by a majority of
the members of the Board during the immediately preceding years, required reviewing
courts to take a view 'less complaisant toward the Board's findings than had been
proper before.' (p. 430, italics supplied). Courts were instructed by the amendment to
be 'less ready to yield their personal judgment on the facts' not resting upon specialized
knowledge.
'Just where the Board's specialized experience ends it may no doubt be hard to say;
but we are to find the boundary and beyond it to deem ourselves as competent as the
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the Board's argument that we are not in as good a position as itself to decide
what witnesses were more likely to be telling the truth in this labor dispute.""
The National Labor Relations Act provides that in determining the
appropriate bargaining unit "the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is
appropriate ... if such unit includes both professional and [non-professional]
employees. ' 21 Nevertheless the Board did just that, and insisted that under
the Act its determination was not subject to judicial review. An issue in
Leedom v. Kyne was whether the federal district courts have jurisdiction of an
original suit to vacate an ultra vires determination made by the National
Labor Relations Board.27 Holding in the affirmative, the Supreme Court
commented: "This Court cannot lightly infer that Congress does not intend
judicial protection of rights it confers against agency action taken in excess of
delegated powers.1 2 The Court also stated: "This is a suit, not to 'review' an
order of the NLRB acting within its statutory powers, but instead is one 'to
strike down an order of the Board made in excess of its delegated powers and
contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act.' 
29
In his chapters on judicial review,30 Conway has discussed the safeguards
that exist to prevent what would otherwise easily become-and sometimes
does-the tyranny of an increasingly articulate bureaucracy. In this age of
atomic energy and ecological awareness, an enormous proliferation of admin-
istrative agencies has become acutely apparent. With the advent of the
bicentennial anniversary celebration, one is tempted to ask: What would the
founding fathers and the framers of the Constitution have thought of the
administrative juggernaut with which we live today?
Professor Conway fully explores the requirement that an appellant must
have exhausted his administrative remedies and become subject to a final
order before judicial review will be granted." He points out that there are
Board to pass upon questions of fact. We hold that all the issues at bar are beyond the
boundary and for that reason we cannot accept the Board's argument that we are not in
as good a position as itself to decide what witnesses were more likely to be telling the
truth in this labor dispute.' (p. 430).
(ii) The Board need not adopt and follow its hearing examiner's findings, but it
must at least consider such flndings and state why it believes them to be unsupported by
a preponderance of the evidence.
'Perhaps as good a way as any to state the change affected by the amendment is to
say that we are not to be reluctant to insist that an examiner's findings on veracity must
not be overruled without a very substantial predominance in the testimony as recorded.'
(p. 430, italics supplied).
CONWAY, supra note 1, at 162.
25. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970).
27. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
28. Id. at 190.
29. Id. at 188.
30. CONWAY, supra note 1, chs. IV-VIII.
31. CONWAY, supra note 1, at 62-70, discussing inter alia, Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuild-
ing Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50 (1938), where the Supreme Court stated the general rule that "no
one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed
administrative remedy has been exhausted."
In Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954), the Court observed: "We have
BOOK REVIEW
three apparent exceptions: 1. When the jurisdiction of the proper administra-
tive body is prima facie lacking, or can be challenged on persuasive grounds;"
2. When the jurisdiction of the agency is apparently present, but the asserted:
charges or allegations are so palpably defective that jurisdiction is merely
colorable;33 or, 3. When the only question is one of law.34 Here, there is no
occasion for submission to an administrative tribunal since there are no facts
to be found and interpretation or construction of statutes, (as in the case of
any other written instruments), is basically a function of the judiciary."' Until
the agency has issued a final order, there is ordinarily no basis for judicial
review and the cases adduced support this rule.
36
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is given a fair share of attention. As
between courts, the first one properly to assume jurisdiction will keep it to the
exclusion of all others. And similarly, where both a court and an administra-
tive tribunal have concurrent jurisdiction, the court will usually defer to the
administrative agency by staying or dismissing the judicial proceeding." This
doctrine may even be used to preclude anti-trust actions.38
Procedural due process in administrative proceedings pursuant to the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States are
covered in some detail in the Outline.3 9 Notice and a fair hearing are essential
ingredients of due process. Thus, the Supreme Court of Virginia has said:
"Appellant is entitled to a fair hearing upon the fundamental facts."14 0 In an
early case, Montgomery Ward & Company v. National Labor Relations
Board,4' the court of appeals emphasized the fact that a hearing requires an
opportunity to be heard. In that case, when the attorneys for Montgomery
Ward attempted to speak, the trial examiner told them to "Shut up." The
noted the other arguments submitted by appellee concerning the interpretation and constitutional-
ity of the statute but it would be premature action on our part to rule upon these until after the
required administrative procedures have been exhausted."
32. On this point, Professor Conway discusses Public Util. Comm'n. v. United Fuel Gas
Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943) and Ward v. Keenan, 3 N.J. 298, 70 A.2d 77 (1949).
33. Conway digests Mowery v. Camden, 49 N.J.L. 106 (Sup. Ct. 1886).
34. Great N. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922); Nolan v. Fitzpatrick,
9 N.J. 477, 89 A.2d 13 (1952); cf. Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967);
Roadway Express, Inc., v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 136, 179 A.2d 729 (1962).
35. 4 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, JAEGER ED., supra note 3, ch. 22, §§ 600 et. seq.
(1961); cf. United States v. Kansas Gas & Electric Co., 215 F. Supp. 532 (D. Kan. 1963),
quoting WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra.
36. Erving v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950). In Chastain v. Spartan
Mills, 228 S.C. 61, 66, 88 S.E.2d 836, 838 (1955), the court noted, "The Commission's order
. . . is not a final one . . . it is, therefore not appealable." Cf. American Tobacco Co. v. SEC, 93
F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
37. Great N. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922); Texas & Pacific R.R.
v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
38. Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1950), quoting United States
Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932).
39. CONWAY, supra note 1, ch. IX.
40. Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190 (1933).
41. 103 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1939). See JAEGER, CASES AND STATUTES ON LABOR LAW 839
(1941).
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court declined to enforce the Board's order on the ground that there had been
no opportunity for the respondent to be heard, thus illustrating the established
rule: that an opportunity for oral argument need not be provided by an
administrative agency, yet, if granted, there must be an opportunity to be
heard.
In his remaining chapters, 42 Professor Conway discusses: licensing;
administrative discretion; proof in administrative proceedings; bias andprejudice; separation of functions, i.e., investigative and quasi-judicial; who
decides the case; and the enforcement of agency orders. In the two hundred
pages containing 306 case digests, Paul Conway has done an admirable job.
He has furnished us with a practical guide to the most significant aspects of
administrative law. His Outline will be most useful to law students, students
of the law and practitioners as well.
42. CONWAY, supra note 1, chs. X-XVI.
